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Utilizing ordered logit we examine the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information 
-adverse selection (intertemporal variability) and moral hazard (interspatial and/or 
residual variability) as revealed by the choice of optional units in Federal crop insurance 
utilizing Risk Management Agency ￿s 1996-2000 cotton yield and loss data files.  
Further, a tobit model is estimated to examine the factors explaining the loss cost ratio 
from Risk Management Agency perspective.  Potential costs of adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard due to optional unit provision are estimated to be as high as $180 million in 
US cotton over the 1996-2000 period. 
 
Keywords:  Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Optional Unit Policy, Crop Insurance, 
U.S. Cotton, Logit and Tobit models. 
 OPTIONAL UNIT POLICY IN CROP INSURANCE 
 
Crop insurance has become much more important as a farm policy instrument 
since the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996.  The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) 
through the Risk Management Agency (RMA) offers several crop insurance policies
1 
relying on private companies for product delivery, service, and loss adjustment.  
Economists have examined numerous aspects of crop insurance including moral hazard 
(Chambers, 1989; Just and Calvin, 1993; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and 
Goodwin, 1996; Coble et al, 1997), adverse selection (Skees and Reed, 1986; Quiggin et 
al, 1994; Just and Calvin, 1995; Atwood, Shaik and Watts, 1999; Shaik and Atwood, 
2002), demand for crop insurance (Coble et al, 1996), rating methodologies (Goodwin, 
1993; Quiggin, 1994; Atwood et. al., 1997; Skees, Black and Barnett, 1997; Goodwin 
and Ker, 1998; Olivier Mahul, 1999;) and more importantly the effects of optional unit 
policy (Knight and Coble, 1996; reports by USDA Office of the Inspector General in 
1994 and 1999;  and the U. S. General Accounting Office in 1999) in Federal crop 
insurance. 
In the early 1980￿s FCIC initiated the optional unit policy for purchasers of 
multiple peril crop insurance.  Under the optional unit provisions, farms which satisfy 
certain spatial requirements are allowed to divided their farm into different insurable 
units and to report yields and collect indemnities separately on each unit. The optional 
units
2 provision is popular with producers due to its low cost (a 10% effective surcharge 
over basic premium charges) and its ability to indemnify legitimate losses on separate  2 
sections of land.  Current crop insurance policies are faced with adverse selection within 
the RMA￿s insured pool of producers.  Given adverse selection, there is avenue for 
potential abuse (moral hazard) of the optional unit provision as the current system relies 
heavily, although not totally, upon self-reporting. 
With asymmetric information due to optional unit policy, a distinction can be 
drawn between hidden information (adverse selection), that is, situation in which a 
producer has more information about his or her risk of loss on the optional units than 
does the insurance provider, and hidden incentives (moral hazard), that is, producers due 
to self reporting can potentially manipulate their optional unit￿s yields to benefit them 
when determining if losses actually occurred.  This kind of moral hazard risk due to 
optional unit policy is different from the traditional moral hazard, defined as the ability of 
the producer to increase his or her expected indemnities by actions taken after buying 
insurance especially use of inputs.  The conventional model of asymmetric information is 
utilized to examine the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in Federal crop 
insurance by the producer￿s risk.  We assume risk is revealed (signaled) by the choice of 
number of optional units.  Ordered logit model is employed to examine the presence of 
adverse selection and moral hazard due to crop insurance optional unit provision for all 
the U.S. cotton producers using 1996-2000 yield and loss data from RMA.  Also a tobit 
model is estimated to examine the factors explaining the loss cost ratio (LCR) from the 
RMA.  Finally the potential cost of adverse selection and/or moral hazard due to optional 
unit provision are estimated to be as high as $180 million in U.S. cotton over the 1996-
2000 period.  3 
 
DECOMPOSITION OF FARM￿S RISK 
The presence of two kinds of asymmetric information -adverse selection and 
moral hazard can be examined by decomposing the farm￿s variability, as farm with 
multiple units is identical to a panel of unit level data over time.  The three-way error 
component decomposition (two-way random effects model) is utilized to decompose 
farm risk into 1) intertemporal risk generally identified with adverse selection, 2) 
interspatial risk that can be identified with systematic difference between the units and 3) 
residual risk that can also be identified with potential moral hazard.  The farm￿s 
variability due to optional unit policy can be decomposed as: 
22 2 2
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                               risk             
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where, T  is the time period and  N  is the number of optional units within a farm,  yit ,  is 
yield for optional unit i  and time t ,  yi  is the mean of unit i ,   yt  is the mean of period 
t , and  y  is the overall mean. 
For a farm with single optional unit, the farm risk is equivalent to the 
intertemporal risk defined as the square root of 
2 () i i Ty y − ∑ , a proxy identified with 
adverse selection.  However for farm with more than one optional unit
3 (panel data), the 
farm risk can be decomposed into intertemporal risk ( )
T α defined as the square root of 
2 () i i Ty y − ∑  identified with adverse selection, interspatial risk ( )
N α  defined as the  4 
square root of 
2 () t t Ny y − ∑  identified with systematic difference across units, and 
residual risk ( )
NT α  defined as the square root of 
2 () it i t it yyyy −−+ ∑∑  identified with 
potential moral hazard.  To illustrate that potential moral hazard can be identified with 
interspatial and/or residual risk, let as assume a farm with three units and yield 
information over ten years.  Table 1 presents the yield information for a three-unit farm.  
Under the extreme assumption that a producer is committing fraud, it would be optimal to 
report 100 bushels of yield on one unit and zero on the remaining two units in a year.  
Next year follow up by reporting 100 bushels on second unit, and zero yields on the first 
and third units and so on.  This would allow the producer to maintain his or her average 
yield and premium rates on each unit, but at the same time trigger maximum indemnity 
payments on individual units sequentially each year.  Under optimal yield switching for 
the above example, the overall risk is explained by interspatial and/or residual risk.  
Result from Table 1 extends it support to the notion that the overall variability (standard 
deviation) of a producer engaged in optimal yield switching is explained by interspatial 
(4.71) and residual (38.21) risk, associated with potential moral hazard. 
The intertemporal, interspatial and residual components of the risk are employed 
in the ordered logit model to examine the presence of asymmetric information in RMA￿s 
insuree pool due to adverse selection and moral hazard along with other variables.  The 
three components of risk along with other variable are also employed in a tobit model to 
examine the factors influencing the loss cost ratio from the RMA perspective.  Logit and 
tobit models are presented in the next section of the paper.  The third section discusses 
the empirical ordered logit and Tobit model to test the presence of adverse selection and  5 
moral hazard along with the description of the data.  The regression results are presented 
in the next section followed by the potential costs of optional unit provision in U.S. 
cotton.  We conclude with the results and conclusion section. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Consider a stylized producer facing a potential loss of future output. Assume that 
the producer is initially endowed with a level of wealth W.  At the end of the next time 
period the producer will realize one of the two possible states
4 of the world - State 1 with 
probability of loss  p and State 2 with probability of no loss ( ) 1− p .  We assume that the 
producer￿s preferences over risky choices can be modeled using expected utility.  The 
objective function can than be modeled as: 
() ( ) ( )( ) 21 U puW L puW =- + -  
Assume that producer purchase insurance for a premium Z payable in state 1, the 
utility objective function is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 31 U puW L I Z p uW Z =- + - + - -  
where W  is the initial wealth,  L  is the loss, I  is the indemnity and Z  is the premium of 
insurance.  Further the indemnity paid depends on the type of insurance product opted by 
the individual producer as signaled by his or her choice of number of optional units 
insured within a farm policy.  Under the assumption of no transaction cost, the premium 
is a function of intertemporal risk 
T α , interspatial risk 
N α , and residual risk 
TN α  
influencing crop insurance optional unit policy and other observable characters () β .  6 
Equation (2) can be re-written as: 
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which has first order conditions (FOC): 
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Sufficient second order conditions for a maximum are that producers be risk 
averse i.e.,  ′′ < u 0 over the relevant domain.  Drawing upon the implicit function 
theorem, if the first order conditions are satisfied equation (6) can be rewritten with 
number of optional units insured within a farm as: 
(7) ( , ) ,,
TNN T OptionalUnits f β ααα =  
where ( , ,
TNN T ααα ) are the intertemporal, interspatial and residual risk respectively 
influencing crop insurance optional unit policy and () β other observable characters. 
Equation (7) can be employed to examine the presence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard expressing individual producer￿s choice of number of optional units insured 
within a farm as a function of risk differentiated into intertemporal, interspatial and 
residual risk; individual farm productivity (average yields), 50% normalized loss cost  7 
ratio, price election, insured share, type of insurance product, type and level of insurance 
coverage, actual yields reported, interaction of number of actual yields reported with 
insurance product and coverage, practice dummy (irrigated versus dryland), state 
dummies, and finally year dummies.  The empirical model examines if RMA￿s insuree 
pool is adversely selected apart from the presence of moral hazard with lower (higher) 
risk producers insuring less (more) number of optional units.  These results have 
important implications with respect to the RMA￿s ability to achieve the often-conflicting 
policy objectives of higher insurance participation, charging actuarially fair premiums, 
and avoiding excessive loss cost ratios.  Results presented below provide strong evidence 
that the insured pool is indeed strongly asymmetric due to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
From the RMA perspective we examine the effects of asymmetric information ￿ 
adverse selection and moral hazard along with individual farm productivity (average 
yields), price election, insured share, type of insurance product, type and level of 
insurance coverage, number of optional units (more importantly to account for the basic 
unit and optional unit structure), actual yields reported, interaction of number of actual 
yields reported with insurance product and coverage, practice dummy (irrigated versus 
dryland), state dummies, and finally year dummies on loss cost ratio normalized to 50%. 
  8 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
To examine the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard due to optional 
units policy, ordered logit model is estimated with the producer’s choice of number of 
optional units insured within a farm policy as the dependent variable.  The producer￿s 
choice of the number of optional unit policy coded as 0,￿..,9 for the ordered logit model 
where 0 corresponds to one optional unit and 9 corresponds to ten or more optional units 
within a farm policy.  Loss cost ratio takes the value that range from 0 to 1, hence a Tobit 
model is employed to examine the importance of adverse selection, moral hazard and 
other factors on LCR from the RMA perspective. 
In the following regressions, the individual producer choice of number of optional 
units within a farm policy is modeled as a function of  (1) farm risk () α decomposed into 
intertemporal risk ( ) x
T
1 defined as the square root of 
2 () i i Ty y − ∑  identified with 
adverse selection, interspatial risk ( ) x
N
1  defined as the square root of 
2 () t t Ny y − ∑ and 
the residual risk ( ) x
TN
1  defined as the square root of 
2 () it i t it yyyy −−+ ∑∑  identified 
with potential moral hazard, (2) farm￿s loss cost ratio 50% () x2 defined as annual 
normalized indemnities to 50% divided by annual normalized liabilities to 50% reflecting 
the expected downside farm risk for the ordered logit model (or) Optional units () x2 , 
defined as the number of units within a farm policy for the Tobit model, (3) farm 
productivity () x3 defined as average yields, (4) Price election  4 () x , defined as the 
percent of price elected for a insured level of yields,  (5) Insured share  5 () x , defined as 
the percentage share of crop on the unit owned by the insured,  (6) Insurance product  9 
6 () x , defined as 0 for CRC revenue insurance and 1 for MPCI yield insurance, (7) 
Coverage level  7 () x , defined as 0, 1, ￿..,6 with 0 for catastrophic, 1 for 50% buyup and 
6 for 75% buyup,  (8) Actuals  8 () x , defined as the 0 for units that reported less than four 
actual yields that include zero actuals, and 1 for units that report more than four actual 
yields, (9) Actuals*IP  9 () x , an interaction of number of actual yields and insurance 
product, (10) Actuals*CT  10 () x , an interaction of number of actual yields and coverage 
level, (11) Actuals*UT  11 () x , an interaction of number of actual yields and unit type ￿ 
basic or optional units used only in the loss cost ratio model, (12) practice dummy 
(Dp r a c _ )- irrigated versus dryland,  (13) state dummy variables ( Ds t a t e s _ ) and (14) 
year dummy for the years 1997 through 2000 ( D year _ ).  The annual dummy variables 
are included to account for the effect of increases in subsidies and changes in policy 
provisions across the years 1996-2000. 
The ordered logit model can be represented as: 
10
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To examine the factors explaining loss cost ratio (LCR) normalized to 50 percent 
coverage, the Tobit model can be represented as: 
11
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  10 
Information on each insuree who purchased cotton insurance for the years 1996-
2000 was extracted from RMA￿s yield history and loss history data files
5.  During this 
time period, producer’s were able to select either multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) 
yield insurance or crop revenue coverage (CRC) revenue insurance; buyup coverage 
levels (catastrophic coverage, 50% - 75% election); and the number of actual yields 
reported by the producer by irrigated or dryland practice.  Each farm￿s risk is 
decomposed into measures of adverse selection and moral hazard utilizing the three-way 
error components decomposition.  The decomposed components are used as a measure of 
farm level risk.  An alternative downside measure of risk is the amount of the indemnity 
actually paid to the producer at the end of the year.  For each of the five years of RMA’s 
loss history data, farm level indemnities were divided by farm level liabilities giving an 
end-of-year farm level loss cost ratio.  The farm level loss cost ratio is used along with 
the decomposed farm risks, as a measure of downside farm level risk in the regression 
analysis. 
The number of insured cotton farms, risk decomposed into intertemporal, 
interspatial and residual risk, mean loss cost ratio, mean insured share and mean yields by 
number of optional units insured within a farm is presented in Table 2.  The intertemporal 
risk (interspatial and residual risk) demonstrates a decreasing (increasing) trend with 
increase in the number of optional units.  While the average yield, insured share and the 
loss cost ratio indicates an increasing trend with increase in the number of optional units. 
Normalized 50% loss cost ratios are substantially higher for multiple unit farms (average 
13.9%) than for single unit farms (average 7.38%). These results are similar in direction  11 
but higher in magnitude than the results presented by Knight and Coble where they also 
found that optional unit loss cost ratios were higher for multiple unit farms. 
Table 3 presents the results of both the tobit and the ordered logit models.  The 
regression results indicate that the various sources of total farm variability are identically 
related to both the loss cost ratio and the number of units insured.  After the 
decomposition of errors, increases in the intertemporal risk component tend to be 
associated with lower LCR￿s and fewer optional units.  Interspatial and residual risks tend 
to be associated with both higher LCRs and an increased number of optional units. 
Other interesting results are apparent from Table 3 as well.  Producers with more 
optional units tend to elect higher price elections and associated with higher insured 
share.  Higher price elections and insured share also tends to be associated with higher 
normalized loss ratios as well.  Producers with higher normalized LCRs tend to purchase 
higher coverage a result consistent with the predictions of the model presented earlier.  
This result is the classic adverse selection result that predicts that producers with higher 
risk will tend to purchase higher coverage if they are charged the same premium rate as 
lower risk producers.  LCR￿s are predicted to be higher for multiple unit farms than for 
single unit farms -a result consistent with previous discussion and with the results 
presented by Knight and Coble for corn, soybeans, and wheat.  Producers with more than 
four actual yields reported tend to insure less number of optional units, however the 
interaction of actual yields reported to insurance product and coverage level seems to be 
positively related to the optional units.  In the tobit model, producers with less than four  12 
actual reported yields are associated with higher LCR, but the interaction of actual yields 
reported to insurance product and coverage level seems to be negatively related to LCR. 
Intertemporal, interspatial, and residual variability appear to be associated 
differentially with loss cost ratios and the number of optional units insured. Research is 
currently being conducted to ascertain to what degree these measures can be used to 
differentiate between adverse selection and moral hazard.  However, it is clear that farms 
with optional units associated on average have higher loss cost ratios than do single unit 
farms.  As we briefly discuss in the following section, most of these higher costs are 
likely to be associated with adverse selection or moral hazard in some form. In the next 
section we attempt to estimate the costs associated with adverse selection and/or moral 
hazard in optional units in US cotton. 
 
POTENTIAL COSTS OF OPTIONAL UNIT PROVISIONS IN US 
COTTON 
In this section we attempt to estimate the program costs of optional unit 
provisions over the time period 1996-2000. Previous studies by Knight and Coble, and 
Kuhling have discussed the provisions of RMA’s unit structure in detail.  Both studies 
reported that RMA’s policy of charging a surcharge to producers who insure multiple 
optional units is justified in that loss-cost ratios are generally significantly higher for 
optionally insured units. RMA’s current practice effectively charges a ten percent (10%) 
surcharge for optionally insured units.  13 
While these studies have shown that the loss rates associated with optionally 
insured units are higher, no study, to our knowledge, has documented a legitimate reason 
why such rates should be higher. Given Knight and Coble’s results as to the striking 
similarities between the size and other characteristics of singly insured basic and optional 
units, we can find no theoretical reason to believe that losses per unit for larger multiple 
unit producers should exceed that of smaller "single unit" producers when the separately 
insured units are of similar size
6. 
To examine the costs of optional units in US cotton, cotton indemnification 
information from RMA’s loss history data-base was aggregated by the number of optional 
units insured for the year’s 1996 through 2000 for each cotton producing state.  Table 4 
presents summary statistics for each state aggregated over the five-year period.  Table 4 
lists by state the number of farms, acreage insured, the insured liability and the average 
LCR of all producers who insured one or independently insured more than one optional 
unit during the period 1996-2000.  
The LCR values in the sixth column were computed as the simple average across 
all producers in the given category. To estimate the amount by which optional unit 
provisions increase program costs, we first compute the approximate indemnities 
associated with multiple units (column 6).  The approximate indemnities associated with 
multiple units are computed as product of total liability (column 4) times the average 
LCR (column 5) across producers.  The excess indemnities in column 7 are computed as 
the difference in the LCR’s of the multiple and single unit farms multiplied by the amount 
of liability (column 4) of the multiple unit farms.  For example in Alabama the LCR of  14 
the single unit farms was (0.143) while the LCR of the multiple unit farms was (0.190).  
The liability of the multiple unit farms was $488,127,165.  The estimated excess 
indemnity generated by insuring multiple units is thus (0.190 - 0.143)*$488,147,165 = 
$22,941,977.  If all farms with multiple units had the average LCR the estimated amount 
of approximate indemnities to the multiple unit group would be $92,744,161.  Thus for 
Alabama we estimate that $22,941,977 (over 23%) of the total multiple unit approximate 
indemnifications of $92,744,161 were generated by abuses of optional unit provisions.  In 
the US as a whole we estimate that costs of optional units in US cotton (in excess of loss 
rates associated with single unit farms) were approximately $180 million over the period 
1996-2000.  For the US as a whole this amounted to about 15% of total indemnifications 
to multiple unit farms during this time period.  If Texas is excluded, total excess 
indemnifications are estimated to have been about $129 million -an amount equal to 28% 
of total indemnifications to non-Texas multiple unit farms. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper used error components procedures to decompose multiple unit farm 
level variability into intertemporal, interspatial, and residual risk. Regression results 
indicate that the three components are differentially associated with loss cost ratios and 
the number of units insured by a given farm. Regression results also support the 
conclusion that loss cost ratios are higher for multiple unit farms as contrasted to single 
unit farms.  The costs of adverse selection or moral hazard in US cotton are estimated to  15 
have been at least $180 million over the 1996-2000 period. 
Further research needs to be done to statistically ascertain to what degree these 
measures can be used to differentiate between adverse selection and moral hazard.   
Additional source of moral hazard associated with reconstituting the farms can and needs 
to be address extending the three-way to four-way error decomposition.  From the RMA 
perspective, the choice of crop insurance policy (in this case number of optional units) 
and the LCR model needs to be estimated simultaneously.  16 
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Table 1.  Decomposition of Risk for an Ideal Case of Optimal Yield Switching for a Three Unit Farm
Intertemporal & Interspatial Risk Residual Risk
Year Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 mean Intertemporal Risk Year Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 mean
1990 100 0 0 33.33 0.00 1990 3600 0 0 1200
1991 0 100 0 33.33 0.00 1991 0 4900 0 1633.3
1992 001 0 0 3 3 . 3 3 0 . 0 0 1992 0 0 4900 1633.3
1993 100 0 0 33.33 0.00 1993 3600 0 0 1200
1994 0 100 0 33.33 0.00 1994 0 4900 0 1633.3
1995 001 0 0 3 3 . 3 3 0 . 0 0 1995 0 0 4900 1633.3
1996 100 0 0 33.33 0.00 1996 3600 0 0 1200
1997 0 100 0 33.33 0.00 1997 0 4900 0 1633.3
1998 001 0 0 3 3 . 3 3 0 . 0 0 1998 0 0 4900 1633.3
1999 100 0 0 33.33 0.00 1999 3600 0 0 1200
mean 40.00 30.00 30.00 33.33 0.00 mean 1440 1470 1470 1460.0
Interspatial Risk 44.44 11.11 11.11 22.22
Risk Interspatial Intertemporal residual farm
Variance 22.22 0.00 1460.00 1482.22
stdev 4.71 0.00 38.21 38.50 19 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the all US Cotton Producers by Number of Optional Units, 1996-2000
Number of  No:of RISK (Adverse Seletion & Moral Hazard) MEAN
Optional Units Farms Intertemporal Interspatial Residual Farm Yield Insured Share LCR 50
1 151,612 161.64 0 0 509.25 0.442 0.078
2 46,039 155.24 36.28 52.24 496.43 0.589 0.116
3 23,688 155.76 55.99 72.97 510.40 0.683 0.126
4 14,712 152.64 66.15 82.84 515.43 0.739 0.135
5 10,153 154.02 73.20 90.40 518.94 0.754 0.134
6 6,927 152.52 78.77 95.37 522.28 0.778 0.144
7 4,928 153.46 82.99 98.80 526.68 0.787 0.138
8 3,679 152.08 85.00 100.07 537.15 0.807 0.144
9 2,803 147.24 87.74 102.42 533.62 0.797 0.150
10 8,882 147.78 96.48 106.32 537.11 0.803 0.163
1 151,612 161.64 0 0 509.25 0.442 0.078
>2 121,811 152.30 73.62 89.05 522.01 0.748 0.139 21 
 
Table 3. Tobit and Ordered Logit Results Examining Optional Units Policy
              US Cotton States, 1996-2000
Parameters Tobit Model Parameters Ordered Logit Model
LCRatio 50 (1,￿..,9)
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
Intercept -1.1601 -8.45 Intercept -1.6835 -5.66
Intermporal Risk -0.0003 -9.09 Intermporal Risk -0.0050 -77.05
Interspatial Risk 0.0001 1.08 Interspatial Risk 0.0082 62.90
Residual Risk 0.0006 9.70 Residual Risk 0.0281 207.89
Average Yield -0.0011 -85.38 Average Yield -0.0002 -6.63
Loss Cost Ratio 50% 0.0763 5.13
Price Election 1.3469 41.34 Price Election 1.4039 22.08
Insured Share 0.1328 17.33 Insured Share 1.8316 122.83
Insurance Product -0.1911 -4.32 Insurance Product -0.2205 -2.27
Coverage level 0.1477 27.39 Coverage level -0.1320 -13.03
Optional Units 0.0503 13.27 Optional Units
Actuals 0.2246 2.91 Actuals -0.4779 -2.86
Actuals*IP 0.0324 1.29 Actuals*IP 0.1199 2.17
Actuals*CT -0.0729 -25.49 Actuals*CT 0.0602 11.34
Actuals*UT -0.0126 -6.02
Practice (Irrigated=1) 0.3273 50.58 Practice (Irrigated=1) 0.6747 53.29
County Rate 0.0003 15.34 County Rate 0.0001 2.53
    Alabama -0.0568 -4.97     Alabama -0.1249 -5.04
    Arizona 0.2457 5.67     Arizona -0.3385 -5.26
    Arkansas -0.3332 -18.27     Arkansas 0.1868 7.25
    California 0.2167 6.91     California -0.8837 -17.12
    Florida -0.0360 -1.14     Florida -0.5150 -8.38
    Georgia 0.0133 1.30     Georgia -0.4750 -23.91
    Louisiana -0.0799 -5.15     Louisiana -0.2259 -8.30
    Missouri -0.4042 -21.78     Missouri -0.4245 -14.48
    Mississippi -0.2930 -13.96     Mississippi 0.4044 12.82
    North Carolina -0.0776 -1.94     North Carolina -0.6215 -8.81
    New Mexico -0.4274 -29.48     New Mexico 0.1879 7.68
    Oklahoma 0.1776 13.34     Oklahoma 0.0125 0.41
    South Carolina -0.0570 -2.43     South Carolina 0.3154 7.54
    Tennessee -0.4476 -20.70     Tennessee 0.3455 10.31
    Virginia -0.7502 -15.38     Virginia 0.1457 2.65
D_97 -0.3964 -35.03 D_97 -0.0042 -0.20
D_98 0.3407 32.03 D_98 0.0172 0.82
D_99 0.0199 1.87 D_99 0.1301 6.29
D_00 0.1407 13.11 D_00 0.1491 7.10








where, IP is the insurance products, CT coverage level and UT unit type 22 
 
Table 4.   Estimated Cost of Crop Insurance Optional Unit Provision in US Cotton, 1996-2000
State # Optional Number of Insured Total Average LCR Approximate Excess % Excess
Units Farms Acres Liability across Producers Indemnities Indemnities Indemnities
Alabama 1 6,099 309,743 71,523,823 0.143
>=2 5,709 1,919,472 488,127,165 0.190 92,744,161 22,941,977 0.247
Arizona 1 1,191 418,763 110,571,517 0.021
>=2 633 427,148 200,921,940 0.052 10,427,922 6,184,570 0.593
Arkansas 1 7,296 732,290 106,825,176 0.016
>=2 5,172 2,213,043 337,171,992 0.016 5,394,752 0 0.000
California 1 3,731 1,538,365 402,268,269 0.013  
>=2 816 827,435 281,800,084 0.042 11,892,973 8,198,812 0.689
Florida 1 505 67,120 13,356,704 0.174
>=2 946 313,524 76,152,182 0.184 13,980,148 758,917 0.054
Georgia 1 10,909 1,345,666 287,024,117 0.128
>=2 14,108 4,430,783 1,007,845,438 0.178 179,798,591 50,726,670 0.282
Kansas 1 247 12,372 1,246,163 0.161
>=2 169 40,847 4,323,823 0.163 704,831 8,788 0.012
Louisiana 1 6,247 707,364 123,532,357 0.054
>=2 4,450 1,669,945 302,707,462 0.056 16,871,406 512,042 0.030
Mississippi 1 5,718 1,698,947 339,209,155 0.033
>=2 3,731 2,211,447 547,477,357 0.070 38,299,434 20,388,646 0.532
Missouri 1 3,565 164,894 19,466,774 0.020
>=2 2,986 856,213 109,309,059 0.024 2,614,359 386,034 0.148
New Mexico 1 833 71,681 12,189,279 0.066
>=2 533 142,676 24,327,825 0.136 3,303,030 1,698,651 0.514
North Carolina 1 4,480 424,506 65,245,811 0.038
>=2 7,596 2,498,982 463,842,951 0.068 31,365,602 13,758,797 0.439
Oklahoma 1 3,630 105,500 15,006,106 0.325
>=2 2,740 609,351 104,110,482 0.341 35,503,536 1,619,609 0.046
South Carolina 1 1,332 255,874 37,309,230 0.083
>=2 1,990 727,007 123,607,870 0.088 10,904,760 673,631 0.062
Tennessee 1 2,388 176,811 25,726,846 0.031
>=2 2,774 1,065,145 168,280,407 0.034 5,673,155 528,727 0.093
Texas 1 92,811 3,820,408 591,716,718 0.236
>=2 66,532 18,219,048 3,037,792,674 0.253 767,443,522 50,898,108 0.066
Virginia 1 668 39,556 6,046,825 0.003
>=2 965 228,484 40,071,244 0.019 780,817 662,021 0.848
US 1,227,703,000 179,946,001 0.147
Excluding Texas 460,259,478 129,047,893 0.280 23 
FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1 The various crop insurance programs are Multli-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI), Crop Revenue Coverage 
(CRC), Revenue Assurance (RA), Income Protection (IP) and Group Risk Protection (GRP). 
 
2 Subdivision of the farm into optional units is allowed for land in different sections under rectangular 
survey, and for irrigated versus dryland production.  A section is one square mile (or 640 acres) and where 
legal descriptions are not based on rectangular survey, alternative criteria such as Farm Agency Service 
farm serial number and non-contiguity are used to define insurable units.  For details see pp 36-44 under 
section 4 of the 2002 Crop Insurance Handbook (APH), Issued: 06/2001 and available at the following 
website http://www.rma.usda.gov/FTP/Publications/directives/18000/pdf/02_18010.pdf. 
 
3  Since we are addressing the issue of moral hazard due to potential yield switching it does not matter if the 
unit is a basic, optional, enterprise unit.  In regards to the choice model, the differentiation holds out, but 
the percent of enterprise unit is less than 0.001. 
 
4 While this example is a highly simplified two-state model, these results can be generalized to a 
continuous distribution using methods similar to those presented in Borch. 
 
5 RMA’s database consists of a number of different databases containing information with respect to 
insurance companies, agents, adjusters, and producers.  RMA’s yield history data set contains producers’ 
reported historical yields used in establishing an average or "approved" yield at the beginning of the 
insurance year.  RMA’s loss history data set records indemnities paid at the end of the insurance year.  
 
6 The lack of a legitimate reason for "higher per unit losses" for multiply insured units should not be 
confused with the fact that loss cost ratios are expected to decline with increases in the number of units 
combined into a larger singly insured "enterprise" unit.  Indeed, if a single producer were to continue 
insuring larger and larger tracts of land as a "single unit" expected loss cost ratios would decline eventually 
approaching RMA’s GRP type rates associated with insuring aggregate countywide yields. 
Alternatively, assume that a single entity initially insured an entire county as one insurable tract. 
In this situation the single entity’s premium rates should be identical to the county or GRP rate.  If this large 
tract of land were broken into smaller and smaller tracts of separately insured units, the expected costs per 
tract would be expected to increase relative to the GRP-type rates. However, this does not imply that the 
large producer’s expected losses on any given section or unit should exceed those of a smaller producer 
insuring similar acreage and quality of land within any given section.  For a more detailed discussion of 
these concepts see Kuhling.  Knight and Coble’s examination of RMA’s loss history data indicates that the 
losses per unit are larger for similar sized but optionally insured units. 